

WWII german deployment of torpedoes in coastal defence

- Exerpts from the War Diary of the German Navy High Command (ONI translation)

1940-04-15

The Fuehrer has ordered an investigation into the possibilities of protecting the entrances to Trondheim, Bergen and into some important fjords (Sogne Fjord, Hardanger Fjord) by the speedy establishment of torpedo batteries. The intention is sealing off at those points which coastal batteries cannot reach or at which they are not available, and where it is not possible to dispose naval forces all the time.

The best torpedo batteries, ready for immediate action, for the intended purpose would undoubtedly be the PT boats; these are, however, urgently required for other assignments in the south Norwegian area, for defense and escort purposes and for operational use end there are not nearly enough of them available.

Three torpedo tubes each have already been dismantled in Trondheim from the THEODOR RIEDEL and PAUL JACOBI and these are to be used as a torpedo barrage battery. The settingup of further shore torpedo batteries at favorable, well camouflaged and easily defended spots in the fjords is to be investigated speedily by the Torpedo Branch in cooperation with Commanding Admiral Norway. Naval Ordnance Division sees possibilities of setting-up such makeshift batteries with the simplest facilities in a very short time by making launching ramps out of wood.

1940-04-16

Situation in Trondheim: Two torpedo batteries, each with a triple tube (dismantled from the destroyers in Narvik) are ready for action near the batteries at Selven and Hysnes.

Situation in Bergen: Preliminary work is in progress by Admiral, West Norwegian Coast for the erection of torpedo batteries.

Situation in Oslo: Torpedo battery South Kaholm ready to fire and manned (The BLUECHER received two hits from this battery).

1940-04-19

The setting up of torpedo batteries is now planned and reconnoitered in Sogne and Hardanger Fjords.

1940-04-24

Reconnaissance of Sogne Fjord with reference to the setting-up of torpedo batteries has been carried out.

1940-04-25

The following torpedo batteries are ready for action in Norway:

Trondheim: 2 triple tubes.

Bergen: 1 battery with 3 tubes.

Oslo: 2 batteries with 6 tubes.

Further batteries are planned to block the following entrances: Kristiansund, Andalsnes, Nord Fjord, Sogne Fjord, Hardanger Fjord. Erection of the last two batteries is planned first. Reconnaissance has been carried out.

1940-04-26

Reconnaissance of Hardanger Fjord with regard to torpedo batteries has been carried out.

1940-04-28

Operation to set up torpedo batteries in Hardanger Fjord has commenced.

1940-04-29

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the Hardanger Fjord torpedo battery is ready for action.

The torpedo battery in Sogne Fjord will probably be in readiness by the end of the week.

1940-05-01

Trondheim is to be defended at all costs against the penetration of enemy forces of any kind.

Apart from the anti-submarine nets planned and the coastal and torpedo batteries which are now ready for action, a reinforcement of these defenses also against fast, light enemy forces (destroyers, motor torpedo boats, etc.) in the form of booms, light guns (3.7 cm anti-tank guns etc.) should be considered.

1940-05-14

As part of the scheme to strengthen the defenses of Bergen, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast intends to fit up further torpedo tubes in the torpedo batteries after dismantling tubes from old Norwegian torpedo boats.

1940-05-22

Installation of a torpedo battery in Nord Fjord completed.

1940-07-06

The torpedo battery Molde is reported to be ready for action.

1941-12-12

Since 2 Dec. the torpedo batteries at Korshavn and Porsoe are ready for action in case of emergency.

1941-12-29

War Diary, Part C, Vol. I contains the opinion of the Armed Forces High Command on the events of 27 Dec. This includes instructions for increasing coastal defenses by bringing up Army forces and materiel to the Commander, Armed Forces, Norway and by reinforcing the Air Force from units in the West. The Commander in Chief, Navy is to investigate the possibility of using additional torpedo batteries (Naval Staff, Operations Division, I/Skl I op 2209/41 op Gkdos. Chfs.). The same document contains a report by the Naval Staff, Operations Division concerning both the completed torpedo batteries and those under construction in Norway. The Naval Staff, Operations Division cannot recommend a greater number of these torpedo batteries because of the slight operational possibilities and meager chances for success as opposed to the very considerable expense necessary to set them up; the Chief, Naval Staff was informed to this effect by teletype message to Fuehrer Headquarters.

1942-02-20

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports to Group North, with copy to the Naval Staff, on the measures taken in 1½ years of hard work, using all possible means, for the protection of Ofoten Fjord and Narvik.

Narvik at this time can be regarded as relatively the best fortified harbor in northern Norway. See Telegram 1920 for details on coastal and torpedo batteries, anti-aircraft protection, protection of the berths in Bogen Bay by anti-aircraft, double net barrage and protective nets at the berths, coastal listening equipment, and deep-lying submarine barrage.

1942-05-08

All experiences with PT boats in the Arctic area have shown thus far that they can be used only occasionally; they depend too much on favorable weather (Within a period of 4 months they participated in one single mission.) Due to the continuous daylight, PT boats can no longer operate offensively in the open sea and therefore are serving now merely as floating torpedo batteries in the coast defense inside the fjords.

1942-07-14

The Chief of the Operations Division, Naval Staff approves the request for installation of 5 new torpedo batteries (very urgent) and 3 new torpedo batteries (urgent). This would beyond doubt greatly strengthen the coastal defenses. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is to be charged with carrying out this request if possible.

1942-09-21

On the basis of a request by the Commanding Admiral, Norway, the Naval Staff inquires how many artillery barges have been asked for use as gun carriers and how many as anti-aircraft carriers. The suggestion made at the same time that naval barges be converted into floating torpedo batteries is still being investigated. Since artillery barges can be used as transports only to a limited extent, the Commanding Admiral, Norway can expect to get a number of additional naval barges for transport purposes soon.

1943-03-18

In compliance with the Fuehrer's order on the expansion of defenses in Norway and the west area, similar to the West Wall, Quartermaster Division has made available eight more triple-mount torpedo tube units for the purpose of setting up torpedo batteries.

Due to the varying nature of the coast, a uniform type of torpedo battery is out of the question. The following are possibilities:

- a.) Ideal battery installed in rock caves.
- b.) Torpedo batteries under cover of shelters - only in urgent exceptions.
- c.) Camouflaged position.
- d.) Mobile or floating battery.
- e.) Single firing tubes to be sunk down.

Naval Staff has requested Group West, Naval Command, Norway, North Sea and Baltic Stations (with copy to Group North) to make another exhaustive examination of conditions in the individual areas and the local circumstances regarding number, position and type of construction of the batteries still considered necessary.

1943-05-10

The floating torpedo battery "Brest" sprung a leak during a storm and is out of action.

1943-05-25

Naval Staff informs Group South as to how torpedo batteries for coastal defense can be set up, and requests the Group to report on proposals for the emplacement of torpedo batteries (I/Skl 149 27A3 Gkdos.).

1943-06-11

The eight floating torpedo batteries which will become ready in home waters between the middle of June and the end of August will be allocated as follows:

Naval Command, Norway will receive the first six;

Naval Station, Baltic will receive the last two provided a suitable use for them can be found. However, Naval Staff is of the opinion that they are not needed in the area of the Gulf of Finland.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Naval (Ship) Construction Division and Torpedo Branch were instructed to restrict the testing of the batteries by the Torpedo Trials Command to the extent essential, so that these vessels, which are not particularly seaworthy, may be transferred during the favorable season and made ready for action as quickly as possible.

1943-06-24

On the basis of the reports requested from Group West, Naval Command, Norway, North Sea and Baltic Stations concerning torpedo batteries within the expansion of coastal defense in the manner of the West Wall (see War Diary 18 Mar. Special Items No. III), Naval Staff, Operations Division takes the following views as opposed to Quartermaster Divisions:

1. According to present experiences the value of torpedo batteries has in general diminished, especially along shallow coasts and steep coasts with a shallow foreground. They constitute a valuable supplement to coastal defense against landing operations in which special entrances and channels have to be penetrated, as for instance in Norway.

2. For reasons of materiel, torpedo batteries can only be made available in a limited number.

3. Details:

- a. Norway: Construction of the torpedo batteries planned so far is still so far behind that provision of further batteries is at present not to be considered,

- b. Baltic Station: The batteries proposed for the Sund and the Belts are also, according to the views of Baltic Station, not urgent as an enemy operation, if any, would be directed against the Jutland peninsula and not against the inner Baltic Sea.
- c. North Sea Station: The mounting of the three harbor barrage batteries requested for the area of Admiral, Netherlands demands considerable expenditure of materiel and work for defense constructions and is therefore to be postponed until the recoil torpedo is ready for operational use.
- d. Group West: The same as stated under c. applies to the five to six new batteries requested.
- e. Group South: Proposals not yet received.

4. A further provision of torpedo batteries is out of the question for the near future or can only be effected to a very small extent.

1943-08-15

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports that as a countermeasure against coastal bombardments, landings on the Calabrian coast and the infiltration of enemy naval forces into the Straits of Messina, the Italian Navy has assigned 2 submarines each to the north and south of the Straits, inside the range of our batteries, by day and by night, and has ordered PT boats to standby at Capri and Grotone. There are also fixed and mobile torpedo batteries in the Straits of Messina for use as assault weapons.

1943-09-23

Chief Torpedo Branch, Naval Ordnance Division, Bureau of Naval Armament reported on the possibility of using Zaunkoenig torpedoes in shore based torpedo batteries. Investigations made some time ago showed this to be impossible, not only because it is necessary that the target area be free from noises, but extremely large quantities of material are required for mounting the torpedo batteries, factors which make it practically impossible to entertain this proposal at present.

1943-10-09

Chief, Naval Staff brought up for discussion further defense measures for the TIRPITZ. Her immobility will tempt the enemy to further attacks. Considerations by Naval Staff to have the ship moved by tugs will encounter great difficulties. Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch is of opinion that the TIRPITZ should remain in Alta until she is at least ready to proceed again with two screws. The present condition of the ship still entails many unknown factors. Defense in Alta against attack by heavy units is still inadequate. No heavy batteries are available. The question of transferring torpedo batteries, perhaps with FAT torpedoes, to Alta is under investigation. The ship's own adequate defensive readiness must, of course, be maintained constantly both materially and as regards personnel.

1943-11-08

Adriatic: The torpedo battery in the entrance to Cattaro is reported ready for action with three tubes and three torpedoes.

1943-11-20

On 8 Nov. Group North/Fleet submitted a number of proposals for carrying out the Fuehrer's Directive No. 51. Copy of letter as per 1/Skl 3369/4-3 Gkdos. in files 1/Skl I op. The suggestions are as follows:

- 4. Naval Forces:
- e. Establishment of groups of naval landing craft as guncarriers or floating torpedo batteries.

1943-11-21

The torpedo battery at Kabala near Cattaro is ready for firing with two tubes and two torpedoes.

1943-12-30

Tirpitz: The Task Force suggests improvised reinforcement of the naval base by motorized Army batteries on Reich Highway 50, by bringing up batteries to fire star shells, by PT boats, by torpedo batteries (with means available), by reinforcement of Army troops, by the intensification of air reconnaissance, patrol service, and increase of signal stations. The Task Force considers the establishment of a Naval Shore Commander, Alta necessary.

1944-01-06

The torpedo batteries "Lilian" and "Drott" in position as before at Talvik. To relieve the shortage of personnel destroyer officers are in command and acting as instructors.

1944-01-11

There is to be an investigation into the question of whether "Zaunkoenig" torpedoes can be used in torpedo batteries. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reported that until now torpedo batteries have been using only G7a torpedoes. The possibility of using G7e torpedoes will be examined.

Torpedo Branch reported on the development of a submerged single tube suitable for all G7 torpedoes and intended for use as a simplified torpedo battery. Operations Division was waiting for this report before making a decision on a number of requests from operational stations for torpedo batteries.

Investigations by Torpedo Branch and operational stations prove that the setting up, and more especially the maintenance of the tube, provide exceptional difficulties with regard to seamanship, and also the delicate mechanism is very vulnerable to the increased effects of aerial bombs under water. In view of these drawbacks it is hardly worthwhile to continue experimenting with new developments and constructions at a time when the capacity of the torpedo arm is already fully extended. Torpedo Branch is of the opinion that, pending further developments, the Navy will have to go on using the present type of construction with a concrete protective cover, or the type of underwater "Ideal" battery to be ready shortly. Torpedo Branch points out that the remote controlled PT boat, as developed and tested by Armed Forces High Command, may be used as a substitute for the simplified battery. Another substitute at present under examination is a simple torpedo launching gear which, fixed on pierheads or bridges, can serve to strengthen the harbor defense. In addition an Italian radio remote controlled torpedo seems suitable for use in coastal defense.

1944-01-14

Naval Command, North suggested that in view of the acute shortage of cable, instead of laying the dependent minefields as proposed in the Wielinger Channel, instructions should be given to the torpedo battery at Flushing to fire an MTA barrage if there is danger of enemy Vessels approaching. The Command requested Naval Staff's approval of the plan and allocation of the MTA's.

1944-03-26

In addition to the heavy air raid on Ymuiden was reported that the completed pens only inflicted small craters up to 40 cm depth of penetration of projectile. The breakdown of materiel and construction tools at the new construction of pens was very serious. The PT-boats pier has been fully destroyed. Presumably, putting out to sea may be blocked at low tide. Besides of the two annihilated PT-boats four harbor defense boats, one floating torpedo battery and several boats were sunk. Further vessels had been damaged. The fitting-out depot and the mining and barrage command are destroyed.

1944-08-05

Group West received instructions to report further intentions concerning the employment of "Dackel" and to endeavor to operate a number of torpedo carriers on one night.

"Dackel" operations were carried out by 6 PT boats on the night of 4 Aug. 24 "Dackel" were launched into the target area of B.E. 3684 left upper corner and 3676 right upper corner from the route-marking buoy.

9 explosions in all were observed between 0357 and 0536 on a correct bearing from Cap de la Heve. Visual observation was not possible owing to fog. A 10th explosion was probably caused by a premature explosion after the safety distance had expired.

A "Dackel" operation is planned for 3 boats of the 6th Minesweeper Flotilla at Le Havre on the night of 5 Aug. and also a torpedo operation by 3. boats of the 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla in the Seine Bay. 5 patrol boat positions were manned in the Channel.

1944-08-06

12 Dackel were launched by three boats of the 6th Assault Boat Flotilla between 0155 and 0220. BF 3684 upper third and BF 3676 upper quarter was the target area. Torpedo detonations were not observed on account of unfavorable wind and continuous strong artillery firing. The boats had a short engagement with fast enemy craft. PT Boat S "97" was hit by a torpedo and arrived at Le Havre. For a Brief report see teletype 0015, 1210 and 1355.

1944-08-07

With reference to the situation in the west the report from Commander PT Boats was read concerning the Operations of Dackel. According to this 36 torpedos and three Dackel (translation doubtful - remark by translator) were launched in two operations. Nine detonations were heard during the first action; this is the only not certain trustworthy support of a success. No facts could be established by radio Monitoring. Request has been made for air reconnaissance at the hour of arrival of Dackel in the operational area.

After the arrival of replacements of Dackel in Le Havre every opportunity will be taken to carry out operations. The number of PT Boats available at the time being was quite sufficient for operations of all ready TIIIId in one night, as more than one operation would not be necessary so far by torpedo carrier. Above all the current conditions of the Seine Bay were strongly determining the operations in one night.

Three boats of the 2nd and 6th Assault Boat Flotilla sailed from Le Havre at 0130 for Dackel operation and returned at 0300. Observation concerning results were not at hand.

1944-06-08

Considering the situation, Group West asked to stop further shipments of torpedo cradles and "Spinne" equipment until further notice.

1944-08-08

Commander in Chief, Navy decided after inquiry that the production of "Dackel" should have the preference before the "Spinne". The Commander in Chief Navy broached the subject of the contingent for the naval landing craft to be used to the advantage of constructing towed bodies. This case will further be examined.

Chief Bureau of Naval Armament reported about the planned transfer of torpedo arsenal center into a salt mine in the Thuringian area and asked the Commander in Chief Navy for his support in this matter by Reichs Minister Speer. The Commander in Chief Navy ordered the examination of a combination between the "Dackel" and "Neger" - principle as well as the fitting up of "Dackel" and "Marder" with LUT as well as the installation of mine fuses in "Dackel". The questions were raised by the Fuhrer.

Group West received instruction to report on "Dackel" reinforcements, proportions of turning our capacities and further intentions.

Eleven Patrol boat positions were occupied off the Channel coast. Dackel operations were planned on the night of the 8 Aug. in the Seine Bay by three PT boats of the 2nd PT boat Flotilla and torpedo operations by the 6th PT boat Flotilla. The command of the fighting units also intended the launching of twelve Kommando - and 16 Ladungslinsen in the Seine Bay.

1944-08-09

On account of the decrease in the maximum speed, the 24th PT Boat Flotilla can only be used with the support of our own Adriatic coast and in the area of the islands. The 22nd PT Boat Flotilla and the coastal defense vessels were according to 2. and apart from this only ready for employment with the close support of our own coast under possible considerations and careful handling of enterprise. Practically coastal defense vessels only signify "Mobile torpedo batteries" in front of our own coast and have a very insufficient artillery fighting strength."

Three PT boats launched ten "Dackel" from the position routemarking buoy Le Havre between 0350 to 0408, Gap de la Heve observed a continuous flare shelling and about 800 short bursts of fire from sea targets between 0130 to 0500. A heavy detonation was observed in 240 at 0450.

The 2nd and 6th PT boat Flotilla entered Le Havre at 0445. "Dackel" operations were planned by three PT boats and torpedo operations by a file against the destroyers in the Seine Bay on the night of the 9 Aug.

1944-08-10

To an inquiry in connection with the "Dackel" production the Bureau of Naval Armament, Torpedo Branch reported that 200 "Dackel" will be delivered up to the end of August.

Group West reported the possibility of workmanship to be at the time 20 "Dackel" daily at the torpedo arsenal West and twelve at Le Havre and 20 under certain conditions. The difficulty lies in the irregular arrival of the "Dackel" and partly in the bad conditions of the arriving torpedos. Nine torpedos were brought in the average daily on their way to Paris for reinforcement. The group planned to employ ready "Dackel" at once. The forthdrawing to improve the possibilities of success by observations at Franceville was ordered. Preferable transmission of the reconnaissance results should be secured by the choice of success promising target areas, air reconnaissance is only seldom. The reconstruction of river tank boats lying at Rouen into naval torpedo batteries was ordered to release PT Boats from "Dackel" missions.

Three PT boats launched eleven more Dackel into the target areas of BF 3676 upper half, 3684 upper half and 3685 1 S in front of the route-marking buoy Le Havre between 0449 and 0510 on the 10th. The precision of the launching may have been probably injured through the fighter-bomber attack at 0505. Four far away detonations were observed at U*p de la Heve between 0555 to 0636 in direction of the launching, one detonation was observed close to a patrol boat, destroyer or minesweeper at 0730 in 272°. The glare of fire and in addition a dark mushroom of smoke was observed near to two destroyers at 0736 in 260°.

A further detonation was perceived far off between 0755 to 0802.

A new Dackel operation and the transfer of the 10th PT Boat Flotilla from Ymuiden to Ustende is planned for the night of the 10th.

1944-08-11

Bureau of Naval Armament, Torpedo Branch informed the Naval Staff of attitude concerning direction of the Commander in Chief Navy about further constructions of Marder and Dackel as follows:

1. The fulfilment of the existing torpedo demand from the Commanding Admiral Small Battle Units is not yet completely covered without drawing from the planned submarine stock respectively surface forces.
2. At the time the new demand of 100 Marder each for October/November and December corresponds to 750 G 7e and in further construction of Dackel in total of 500 pieces corresponds to 300 G7e which means holding in readiness further 1050 G7e (G7e = special kind of torpedo, Transl.)
3. The needed acceleration of construction of G 7e which is urged in a hurry cannot be reached in a short space of time. The holding in readiness of these 1050 G 7e is therefore only possible through encroachment of the planned surface-respectively submarine stock or through reducing the demands of the Commanding Admiral, Small battle Units.
4. The advance work for the manufacture of Marder and Dackel was started by the Bureau of Naval Armament, Torpedo Branch according to No. 2. The needed decision of the Commander in Chief Navy concerning the total situation of torpedo construction will soon be made.

Dackel operation was carried out according to plan. Two detonations were observed at 0612 near Cap de la Heve between 220° to 240°. The observation posts could not report results owing to poor visibility.

1944-08-12

Commander PT boats reported to Group West his belief that the enemy had recognized that the launching of Dackel was carried out in the area of Le Havre. Opinion expressed by Group West is expected.

1944-08-14

Group West reports that at the most Dackel operations will be impossible only on three nights in August on account of the quoted current conditions after re-examining the disposition given by the Commander PT Boats. Therefore the group did not agree with the plans of the Comaander PT Boats but issued orders for a further continuous employment of ready Dackel as soon as the needed number for operations were at hand. Sufficient stops for operations with normal torpedoes appear at indefinite periods as Dackel delivery is unregular and is not made in the expected amount.

To the question from the Fuehrer respectively Commander in Chief, Navy concerning the combination of Marder-Dackel as well as a mine function for Dackel the Chief, Torpedo Branch, Bureau of Naval Armament explains the difficulties for the developments respectively constructions of the mentioned combinations and draws attention to the one-man torpedo type "Hai".

The Commander in Chief, Navy ordered a re-examination and emphasized the point of view that targets should not be sighted and the advantage of the LUT (lagenunabhängiger Torpedo - torpedo independent of direction - Transl.) added with the minefuse should be made productive. The Chief, Torpedo Branch, Bureau of Naval Armament draws attention to the heavy stress under which the torpedo experimental establishment is working which led to the fact, that new tasks run at the expenses of the Ingolin torpedo.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, ordered the Bureau of Naval Armament to adopt all suitable measures for the torpedo experimental establishment to live up to the expectations concerning production as required.

For the night of the 14 Aug. torpedo operation was planned with four boats of the 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla, Dackel operation with two boats of the 6th Minesweeper Flotilla and transfer of the 2nd Group of the 8th Minesweeper Flotilla from itotterdam to Bologne meeting the Commander 8th Minesweeper Flotilla with the 1st Group off Ostende. With five boats the 10th Minesweeper Flotilla will contaminate the convoy route. Also minefield K5b will be laid.

1944-08-15

Torpedo operations by the 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla were cancelled on the night of the 14th. Owing to weather situation eight Dackel were launched from the route marking buoy Le Havre by two boats of the 6th Minesweeper Flotilla between 2258 and 2329 on the 14 May (should obviously mean Aug). About seven detonations were heard by observation posts between 0005 and 0022 of which three could also be observed.

A steady strong glow of fire and the sinking of an object was observed at 0145* Group West attaches little trustworthiness to these observations as evidently the firing of heavy ships artillery was accepted as detonations.

1944-08-16

Commander PT Boats presented a survey of the Dackel employment sector from the 4th to the 11th Aug. which enclosed six operations off Le Havre with a total of 76 torpedos.

Commander PT Boats believes only the sight and detector sets of two special equipped direction finder stations to be reliable as far as observations were possible during night and in the twilight, when judging the observations of effect. The same applies to the observation post of the Operational Staff B'ohme. In return observations of the naval and army coastal batteries were regarded as unreliable and expelled, just so observation from the air force stations. Also flying air reconnaissance is not reliable as they very often take firing ships artillery for detonations. The Commander PT Boats without pronouncing a final sentence to the value of Dackel operations is therefore sceptical to the majority of reported observed successes, as real observations from the sinking of ships were not at hand and especially as the radio monitoring up to now made no reports about torpedoing, averages, sinkings etc.

1944-08-17

To the attitude stated by the Commander PT boats concerning Dackel successes, Group West reports that they were not criticizing them so sceptically as done by the Commander PT Boats. The sentences of the radio monitoring was always nil also in the cases of obvious successes of the Small Battle Units. Therefore the absence of these cannot be asserted as reason for an unfavorable survey.

1944-08-27

In connection with the report - Western Situation, Operations Branch, West reports that Group West renounced of using Le Havre as a PT boat base after the 27 Aug. as possibilities for offensive operations of PT boats were very small, operations of Zaunkönige impossible as reinforcements were cancelled and regulating posts withdrawn and as Dackel operations were possible again earliest in six days. Mining, blocking and destruction of Le Havre were started.

1944-08-28

Along the Atlantic and Channel coast were each five Spinne batteries with torpedoes ready for action and twelve along the Southern French Coast, Ninety torpedoes were lost by the 17 batteries out of action along the Atlantic and Southern French coast. Fifty-three further torpedoes were ready and 27 nearly completed. It was planned to leave five batteries with each four torpedoes at the Atlantic coast and to mount nine batteries with four torpedoes along the Jutlandic coast.

After the report from the Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament about the present distribution of Dackel and Spinne torpedoes the Commander in Chief Navy decided that new arrivals of torpedoes of this kind should not be forwarded more as far as they were not already despatched. Till now Group West received all these torpedoes. Group West should be asked to state how they intend to carry out future operations.

1944-08-29

Based on the land situation, Group West ordered the mining and blocking of Le Havre as well as the evacuation of all bases westerly of Boulogne. PT boat and Dackel-operations were cancelled from Le Havre. It was planned to transfer the last forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West from Dieppe to the east on the evening of the 30th. Radar equipment at Antifer and Ebretat were evacuated. According to possibilities equipment will be transferred.

1944-08-30

It was further proposed to detach 36 Spinne-torpedoes for the Skagerrak. Commander in Chief Navy agreed. Statement is still expected from the Naval Command East.

The Commander in Chief, Navy ordered preparations to be made for Dackel operation in Jutland from auxiliary launching places.

1944-08-31

As the western coast of Jutland will not be suitable for landing in the coming season the eastern coast and the Danish Islands must be looked upon as especially endangered.

3. In detail the following measures were planned:

d. Prepare "Dackel" operations in connection with the local operational conditions as far as promising success.

1944-09-05

I. Naval Armaments was informed by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division that the "Dackel" (Manned torpedoes Tr.N.) operation in the West Area is completed. Therefore "Dackel" are to be evacuated from the Netherlands. Use of these torpedoes in the Jutland area is to be considered. Torpedo Ordnance Department should store 100 "Dackel" and equipment for setting up of a torpedo regulating station near Kolding, to

secure quick transport to areas threatened by enemy landings on short notice.

1944-09-07

The Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic is opposed to the intended use of "Spinne" torpedo batteries in the Danish area. The reason is that their range is too small and that the enemy would probably land on the open beach. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division proposes that in recognition of the aforementioned facts no use be made of the "Spinne" torpedo batteries in Denmark. Commander in Chief, Navy does not agree with the stand taken by Naval Command, Baltic and decides that this combat means is also to be put into action in Denmark. It would be useful for harbor defense even after a landing on the open beach.

1944-09-22

The torpedo battery near Pola was reported temporarily ready for action with a set of twin-tubes.

1944-10-19

As the anti-torpedo batteries Kobilja and Kabala have no steadiness against air raids, and the number of personnel for a safe protection against partisans and landing troops as well as for the gun crews bears no proportion to the tactical value and combat value, the Naval Staff, the Group South and the Admiral, Adriatic suggest that the Batteries be dismounted and, if possible, be transferred to the area of Istria and put into action there.